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Game design
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#	Item
171	Modularity and Greed in Double Auctions ¨ PAUL DUTTING , Stanford University TIM ROUGHGARDEN, Stanford University INBAL TALGAM-COHEN, Stanford University Add to Reading List Source URL: paulduetting.com Language: English - Date: 2014-04-24 00:51:07 Auction theory Game theory Auctions Mechanism design Decision theory Gaming Double auction VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism Auction Deferred-acceptance auction Eauction Incentive compatibility
172	DOCX Document Add to Reading List Source URL: www.w4a.info Language: English - Date: 2016-04-02 09:29:39 Design Web accessibility Education Disability Assistive technology Accessibility Game accessibility Jutta Treviranus Web Accessibility Initiative Web Content Accessibility Guidelines Inclusive Design Research Centre Chieko Asakawa
173	CS364B: Frontiers in Mechanism Design Lecture #3: The Crawford-Knoer Auction∗ Tim Roughgarden† January 15, Add to Reading List Source URL: theory.stanford.edu Language: English - Date: 2014-01-21 00:57:01 Auction theory Auctions Mechanism design Game theory VickreyClarkeGroves auction VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism Auction English auction Revelation principle Competitive equilibrium Vickrey auction
174	A Payment Rules through Discriminant-Based Classifiers ¨ PAUL DUTTING , Stanford University, USA FELIX FISCHER, University of Cambridge, UK Add to Reading List Source URL: paulduetting.com Language: English - Date: 2015-06-25 03:05:02 Mechanism design Game theory Loss function Strategyproofness Monotonicity Incentive compatibility Revelation principle
175	On the Price of Truthfulness in Path Auctions Qiqi Yan? Department of Computer Science, Stanford University Abstract. We study the frugality ratio of truthful mechanisms in path Add to Reading List Source URL: www.qiqiyan.com.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com Language: English - Date: 2012-07-04 18:28:36 Mechanism design Game theory Social choice theory VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism
176	COMP 185H: Serious Games Bulletin Description Concepts of computer game development and their application beyond entertainment to fields such as education, health, and business. Course includes team development of a game Add to Reading List Source URL: wwwx.cs.unc.edu Language: English - Date: 2016-01-25 10:35:32 Educational psychology Video game development Game design Educational technology Video game Good Game Gameplay Serious game
177	Distributed Implementations of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms David C. Parkes Division of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Harvard University, 33 Oxford Street, Cambridge MA 02138 Add to Reading List Source URL: www.eecs.harvard.edu Language: English Game theory Mechanism design Distributed algorithmic mechanism design VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism Strategyproofness Revelation principle Vickrey auction Agent-based model Incentive compatibility Algorithm VickreyClarkeGroves auction Multi-agent system
178	A Truthful-in-expectation Mechanism for the Generalized Assignment Problem Salman Fadaei and Martin Bichler Department of Informatics, TU München, Munich, Germany , Add to Reading List Source URL: dss.in.tum.de Language: English - Date: 2015-07-06 06:27:57 Game theory Convex optimization Linear programming Operations research Mechanism design Expected value VickreyClarkeGroves auction Submodular set function
179	Strategyproof Mechanisms for Ad Hoc Network Formation C. Jason Woodard∗ David C. Parkes† Division of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Harvard University, Cambridge, MAMay 21, 2003 Add to Reading List Source URL: netecon.seas.harvard.edu Language: English - Date: 2009-11-30 14:32:04 Game theory Mechanism design Strategyproofness VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism Distributed algorithmic mechanism design Double auction Incentive compatibility VickreyClarkeGroves auction Algorithmic mechanism design Network formation Mathematical optimization
180	Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types Daniel Kr¨ahmer∗ January 21, 2011 Abstract This paper studies optimal auction design when the seller can affect the buyers’ valuations through an unobservable Add to Reading List Source URL: www.wiwi.uni-bonn.de Language: English - Date: 2011-01-21 03:44:57 Game theory Auction theory Mechanism design Auctions Social choice theory Auction Double auction Bayesian-optimal pricing

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